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Abstract 
To analyse the consequences of the changing economic structure of the UK, we need a 
set of statistics broken down by industry that are consistent with the whole economy 
measures available from the national accounts.  The theory of growth accounting then 
provides a framework in which the contribution of each industry to the national economy 
can be measured and assessed.  This paper identifies the obstacles currently facing a 
researcher trying to implement this approach.  It makes a number of recommendations for 
the improvement of official statistics.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
To analyse the consequences of the changing economic structure of the UK, we need a set of 
statistics broken down by industry that are consistent with the whole economy measures 
available from the national accounts.  For each industry, we need at a minimum measures of 
output and of inputs.  The theory of growth accounting then provides a framework in which 
the contribution of each industry to the national economy can be measured and assessed.  
Growth accounting also enables us to see how these contributions are evolving over time.   
The pioneering growth accounting studies were at the whole economy level.  Whole 
economy studies can be illuminating, but in practice policy makers frequently want to know 
what is going on at the sectoral and industry level.  Through the work of Domar (1961), 
Hulten (1978) and Jorgenson et al (1987), the growth framework has been extended to the 
industry level.  “Best practice” in this area is the Jorgensonian growth accounting framework, 
now enshrined in two OECD manuals (OECD (2001a) and (2001b)).  Growth accounting 
analyses have been very influential in the ongoing debate about the US productivity 
acceleration of the 1990s (Oliner and Sichel (2000); Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000a) and 
(2000b)).  They have also been employed to inform the UK policy debate (O’Mahony 
(1999)) and to analyse the failure of Europe or the UK to experience a similar productivity 
acceleration (Colecchia and Schreyer (2002); van Ark et al (2002); O’Mahony and van Ark 
(2003); Basu et al (2003); European Commission (2003)).   
To some, growth accounting, based as it is on the assumption of perfect competition, may 
seem simplistic.  But if one lacks the statistical tools to do growth accounting then it is 
unlikely that one will be able to carry o ut supposedly more sophisticated analyses either.  
Also, the statistics required for growth accounting can be used as a basis for testing more 
complex hypotheses going beyond those required for growth accounting itself (as eg is done 
by Basu  et al (2003)).  Another advantage of the growth accounting framework is that 
implementing it imposes an important discipline:  more tests are imposed on the consistency 
and coherence of the national accounts than is the case at present.   
 
Outline of the paper 
 
To implement the growth accounting framework at the industry level, we need for each 
industry measures of both gross output and value added on the one hand and of all the inputs 
— capital, labour and intermediate — on the other.  It turns out that at the moment this is  
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quite a difficult task using official UK data.  The first difficulty arises from the way in which 
the growth of output is measured by the ONS at the industry level, which is inconsistent 
conceptually with the way that the growth of GDP is measured.  This difficulty, which is 
important even if we do not seek to do a full growth accounting analysis, is discussed in 
Section 2.  Section 3 sets out the growth accounting framework in an informal manner, 
showing it to be an extension of, not a substitute for, the national accounts as they currently 
exist; Annex A provides a more formal treatment.  Section 4 is a brief discussion of the 
concept of sustainability.  It shows how one particular measure of sustainability, which I call 
Weitzman’s Net Domestic Product, can be calculated within the same framework.  Section 5 
sets out the barriers which currently confront a researcher seeking to implement the growth 
accounting framework.  These can be divided into mundane difficulties which could be fixed 
relatively easily, and deeper conceptual and measurement issues.  The latter centre round (1) 
the measurement of output and prices in the private services industries (considered in more 
detail in Annex B); (2) the measurement of capital services; and (3) issues surrounding 
information and communications technology (ICT).  Lest the reader feel overwhelmed by the 
difficulties, Section 6 considers how the US statistical agencies tackle parallel problems and 
shows how they have solved some (though not all) of them.  Section 7 draws together the 
conclusions.   
 
 
2.  GDP and Industry Output:  Ensuring Consistency 
 
It is well known that GDP at current prices can be measured in three ways:  from income, 
output or expenditure.  In principle, the three estimates must yield the same answer, in the 
absence of errors and omissions.  It is not so often appreciated that the growth of GDP in real 
terms can be measured in several ways too and that the different ways must also be consistent 
in principle.  For example, the growth of aggregate output (GDP) can be thought of as an 
average of the growth rates of the industries that make up the national economy.  Equally, it 
can be thought of as an average of the growth rates of the different forms of expenditure on 
final output.  The growth of the national economy can also be thought of as an average of the 
growth rates of the regions, and the latter in turn can be thought of as averages of the growth 
of regional output or of regional expenditure.    
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In nominal terms GDP is either a sum of value added in each industry or it is a sum of 
final expenditures net of imports (final outputs) and these two sums are equal in principle.  
We can show that this equality must hold by definition of value added.
1  But in addition to the 
level of GDP in current prices, we are also interested in the growth rate of the volume of GDP 
(real GDP).  We obviously want the growth rate of real GDP to be the same, whether we use 
the output or the expenditure approach.  It would be very strange if expenditure-side GDP in 
current prices was always equal to output-side GDP, but the growth rate of the two measures 
differed.  If this was the case, GDP would not be a very useful concept.  It can readily be 
shown that (in the absence of errors, omissions or inconsistencies in the underlying statistics) 
the two measures of growth will yield the same answer.  But for this to be the case, we must 
measure real value added in each industry by double deflation.
2  Double deflation means that 
an industry’s gross output is to be deflated by the price of its output, while each input, 
whether domestic or imported, is to be deflated by its own price index.  For example, if in 
addition to labour and capital, flour is required to make bread, then to measure real value 
added in bread-making, we must deflate the value of output by the price of bread and the 
value of the purchased input (flour) by the price of flour.   
For any industry, the definition of value added in current basic prices is:   
 
  Value added   = Gross output minus  Intermediate input (domestic and imported)  
 
= Gross operating surplus (profits) + Wage bill + Taxes on production  
 
The sum of value added across industries is GDP at current basic prices.   
There are two ways in which real GDP may be measured, from the output or from the 
expenditure sides.  From the output side, an index of GDP growth (GDP(O)) is:  
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1   For the moment we are neglecting the difference between basic prices, which are normally used to measure 
GDP(O), and market prices, normally used to measure GDP(E).   
2   This fact is well known to national income statisticians:  see Commission of the European Communities – 
Eurostat et al. (1993).    
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Here  i w  is the share of nominal value added of industry i in current price GDP,  i V  is real 
value added in the ith industry, a “hat” denotes a growth rate, and there are n industries.  
Second, from the expenditure side (GDP(E)):   
 
11
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where  i E  is final expenditure on the products of industry i and  i s  is the share of final 
expenditure on i in current price GDP.  We can readily show that these two measures of GDP 
growth are equal, in the absence of errors or omissions in the statistics.
3  But note that 
equality is only guaranteed in  principle if the growth of real value added is measured by 
double deflation:  see Annex A.   
In practice, of course the two estimates of growth will differ.  The reconciliation between 
them is a complicated process.  First of all, there is the reconciliation between levels in 
current prices.  In addition to the quarterly balancing process, there is a quite separate annual 
balancing process to reconcile the output and expenditure approaches, using the input-output 
supply and use tables.
4  Next, successive estimates of levels have to be converted into 
estimates of growth rates.  The ONS takes the view that for measuring growth on an annual 
basis the expenditure side estimate is the most reliable.  For quarterly  data, the ONS 
considers that movements within the year are best measured by GDP(O), but growth over the 
whole year is constrained to match the expenditure measure.   
Concepts, Sources and Methods states: “In the UK economic accounts, the expenditure 
approach is used to provide current price and volume measures of GDP.” [paragraph 11.164]. 
The 1998 Blue Book (Office for National Statistics (1998b), pages 137-138) spells this out in 
more detail:  
 
“Constant price gross value added provides the lead indicator of economic change in the 
short term.  However in the long term, constant price gross value added is required to 
follow reasonably closely the path indicated by the constant price expenditure measure of 
GDP.  To achieve this, special additional balancing adjustments (or coherence factors) are 
sometimes required to be included within gross value added at constant basic prices, as 
explained below.  These instances can occur particularly in periods of rapid change in 
economic activity. ... An examination of the constant price gross value added and 
                                                 
3   This ignores the difference between market prices at which expenditure is usually measured and basic 
prices at which output is usually measured.  But the argument can easily be extended to encompass this point.   
4   At the moment this is done only in current prices, though eventually it may be done in constant prices too 
(Ahmad (1999); Tuke and Aldin (2004)).    
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expenditure measures of GDP suggested that the growth in the measure of gross value 
added was over-stated by around half a per cent between 1988 and 1989.”   
 
This makes clear that, eventually, the annual constant price output side estimates are 
constrained to follow the expenditure ones.  In the published figures, there is no discrepancy 
between the two annual estimates (unlike in the US National Income and Product Accounts:  
see below), but this is because the output side estimate is adjusted to conform to the 
expenditure side one.  The reason for preferring the expenditure side estimate is threefold:   
 
1.  The output of some industries is less well measured than others, ether because of 
conceptual difficulties or because less statistical effort is devoted to them.  There is as 
yet no counterpart in the private service industries to the Producer Price Index (PPI) 
programme that covers the production sector.  Much of the hard-to-measure part of 
the economy is engaged in producing intermediate products (eg business services or 
wholesale banking) and these activities largely drop out of GDP measured from the 
expenditure side.
5  See Annex B for more on this.   
 
2.  More detail is available on the expenditure side and the price indices are more 
reliable.  The Retail Prices Index  programme is far more extensive than the PPI 
programme.   
 
3.  In practice the ONS does not use double deflation to estimate real value added (except 
in electricity supply and agriculture); instead it uses real gross output as a proxy for 
real value added:  see Office for National Statistics (1998), chapters 11 and 13, and 
Sharp (1998).
6  So even in the absence of errors and omissions, the output and 
expenditure side estimates would not be equal and the output side estimate would be 
wrong, unless in each industry real gross output and real intermediate input were 
growing at the same rate, which is clearly unlikely.  The discrepancy between the 
output and expenditure side estimates is removed by adjusting output growth in the 
private service industries; output in the production sector (about a third of the 
economy) and in the government sector (about a fifth) is not adjusted.   
 
                                                 
5  Not completely, since some enter into international trade.   
 
6   In most cases, real gross output is measured by sales deflated by an appropriate price index.    
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Even though the growth of the production sector is incorrect as a measure of its 
contribution to GDP growth (since the Index of Production uses single deflation), it is left 
unadjusted.
7  So the whole burden of errors and omissions, together with the error caused by 
the use of single rather than double deflation, is thrown onto the estimates of growth in the 
private services industries.  The size of the adjustment needed to make GDP(O) conform to 
GDP(E) is not published.  It is clearly very unfortunate that, at a time when the private 
service industries have been growing in importance, our understanding of their performance 
should be distorted in this way.   
In fact, the ONS has the basic means available to implement double deflation, at least for 
recent years, using the Input-Output Supply and Use Tables, which are available on a fully 
consistent basis from 1992 onwards.  These are in current price terms and play an essential 
role in the current price balancing process.  The ONS has also had a programme, called the 
Constant Price Input Output (KPIO) programme, which has been investigating balancing in 
real terms, in effect double deflation (Ahmad (1999); Powell and Swatch (2002)).  But so far 
double deflation has not been incorporated into the national accounts process.  The First 
Report of this Review (Allsopp (2003), paragraph 6.10) recommended use of the output 
approach for estimating regional GDP.  Adoption of double deflation would be consistent 
with this.   
 
 
3.  The Growth Accounting Framework
8 
 
The growth accounting framework is now more than fifty years old.  Though it was first 
formalised by Solow (1957), the earliest empirical applications preceded his seminal paper 
(Hulten (2000)).  Subsequently, the framework has been deepened by Jorgenson and his 
various collaborators (eg Domar (1961), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), Hulten (1978), 
Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987), and Jorgenson (1989).  This approach has now been 
codified in two OECD manuals (OECD (2001a) and (2001b)).  Annex A sets out the 
approach more formally.  Here we give an informal treatment.   
 
                                                 
7   The Review of Short Term Output Indicators suggested that the IoP too should bear a share of the 
adjustment (ONS (2000)).   
8   See Annex A for a more formal derivation.    
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3.1  The aggregate framework 
 
The starting point is the familiar aggregate growth accounting equation: 
 
Growth of GDP = [Capital’s share times growth of capital input]  
     plus [Labour’s share times growth of labour input] 
     plus growth of TFP                           (1) 
 
where GDP, capital and labour are all chain indices of their respective components.  Thus 
labour input is a weighted average of the growth rates of the different types of labour, where 
the weights are the shares of each type in the aggregate wage bill; the shares are equal to the 
elasticities of output with respect to the inputs under the assumption of perfect competition.  
Capital input is defined as aggregate capital services, not capital stock.  The treatment of 
capital is therefore exactly analogous to the treatment of labour, where each type of labour 
input is measured by the flow of labour services, ie hours worked.
9  Labour input grows 
either if hours worked increase or if the quality of labour increases; the latter occurs if the 
composition of the labour force shifts towards better paid workers (Burriel-Llombart and 
Jones (2004)).  TFP growth is calculated as the residual.   
This equation can be rearranged in per hour worked terms as  
 
Growth of GDP per hour worked =  
Capital deepening  
plus Labour quality contribution  
plus TFP growth                              (2) 
where  
Capital deepening = [Capital’s share times growth of capital input per 
hour worked]  
Labour quality contribution = [labour’s share times growth of labour 
input per hour worked]  
 
                                                 
9   The important distinction between capital services and capital stock was introduced in Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) and set out theoretically in Jorgenson (1989).  For further discussion, see Diewert and 
Lawrence (2000) and Oulton and Srinivasan (2003a).    
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Building up from the industry level 
 
The next step is to build up the aggregate relationship of equations (1) or  (2) from 
corresponding relationships at the industry level.  Suppose we have data on the price and 
quantity of gross output and the prices and quantities of inputs and outputs for a set of 
industries covering the whole economy.  These data can be used to measure the growth of 
TFP in each industry.  For the ith industry:  
 
Growth of TFP in industry i =  
Growth of gross output of i 
minus cost-share-weighted growth of capital services, labour 
and intermediate input                       (3)  
 
We can also calculate TFP growth using prices rather than quantities, the so-called dual 
approach:  
 
Growth of TFP in industry i =  
minus [Growth of price of gross output of i 
minus cost-share-weighted growth of prices of capital services, 
labour and intermediate input]                  (4) 
 
Provided that the accounting system is consistent, the dual approach of (4) must yield exactly 
the same answer as the primal one using quantities, equation (3).
10   
The crucial link between the industry TFP rates and the aggregate TFP growth rate is 
provided by the concept of Domar aggregation (Domar (1961)):   
 
Aggregate TFP growth rate = Domar-weighted sum of industry TFP growth rates     (5) 
 
where the Domar weight for industry i is  
 
 




                                                 
10   At the aggregate level there is a dual analogue to equation (1) as well.    
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Note that the Domar weights sum to more than 1; this reflects the fact that each industry 
makes a double contribution to aggregate TFP, once in its own right and once through 
reducing the costs of industries that buy from it.  Equation (5) can be shown to hold exactly if 
any given input (eg university-educated female workers aged 30-34) is paid the same wage in 
all industries.  If this is not the case, then the equation for aggregate TFP growth also contains 
terms reflecting the reallocation of capital and labour towards or away from higher value uses 
(Jorgenson et al (1987)).  But the Domar-weighted sum of equation (5) can still be regarded 
as the best measure of underlying productivity growth at the aggregate level.  Equation (5) 
enables us to trace the sources of aggregate TFP growth rate to its industries of origin.  
Changes in aggregate TFP can be assigned either to changes in the underlying industry rates 
or to structural change (changes in the Domar weights).   
 
 
4.  Sustainability 
 
Sustainability is a contentious concept that can no doubt be defined in more than one way.  
But the central notion behind the concept is the level of consumption that can be maintained 
indefinitely, without running down or using up stocks of resources, whether natural or man-
made.  This notion has a long history in economics.  It is related to the concept of “permanent 
income” familiar to macroeconomists and to the concept of “real income” suggested by Hicks 
(1940).  The modern formulation is due to Weitzman (1976), elaborated in Weitzman (1997) 
and (2003).  It turns out that the statistical framework required for the analysis of 
productivity, namely growth accounting, can also be an important building block for the 
analysis of sustainability.   
Weitzman’s net domestic product, denoted by WNDP, is defined as net domestic product 
(NDP),
11 measured in consumption units.  Alternatively, it is current price NDP deflated by 


















    (6) 
                                                 
11  Net national product is Weitzman’s term, though net national income might be more appropriate.  I use the 
term ‘net domestic product’ to retain the link with the national accounts and because I am neglecting net income 
from abroad.  See Sefton and Weale (1996) for estimates of WNDP for the United Kingdom.    
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where  t C  is real consumption;  it K D  is the growth of the ith capital stock (i = 1,…,n) or 
equivalently real net investment in the ith stock;  Ct P  is the nominal price of consumption 
goods;  it P  is the nominal price of the ith type of capital; and  it p  is the relative price of the ith 
type of capital in terms of consumption goods [/]. itCt PP =    
Weitzman shows that WNDP can be considered a monetary measure of social welfare.  
The intuition behind WNDP is that only consumption matters for welfare.  So the current 
level of consumption must obviously be part of the measure.  In addition, net investment 
increases future consumption.  The second term on the right hand side in equation (6) above 
can be interpreted as the present value of the future stream of consumption that is generated 
by adding to capital stocks.  Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the additional amount of 
consumption (over and above actual current consumption) which could be enjoyed on a 
permanent basis, if capital stocks were just maintained rather than augmented.   
Weitzman (1976) gave a more formal justification.  He showed that WNDP is 
proportional to the yield on wealth (assuming perfect competition and no externalities).  That 
is, it is equivalent to permanent income.  Consider an economy which behaves as if it is 
governed by a social planner who seeks to maximise wealth, defined as the present value of 
the stream of real consumption, subject to technological constraints and to given initial 
capital stocks.  Along the optimal path, Weitzman showed that WNDP is the yield on wealth, 
ie it is equivalent to permanent income.  WNDP can therefore be considered a cardinal 
measure of welfare.  This i s important because WNDP is directly observable:  only current 
prices and quantities enter into WNDP, while measuring wealth directly would require 
forecasting an infinite stream of future consumption.   
It might seem at first sight that measuring WNDP is easier than measuring GDP, since the 
only price we need to know is the price of consumption.  But this would be incorrect.  WNDP 
requires us to measure capital stocks and to do this properly, we need to know the prices of 
investment goods (correctly adjusted for quality) and also depreciation rates.  We could 
estimate WNDP at the aggregate level only.  But just as in practice policy-makers and 
analysts are interested in tracing the sources of GDP growth, so it is likely that they would 
want to do the same for WNDP, if it became customary to calculate it.  It can be shown that a 
similar kind of growth accounting decomposition, requiring the same statistical materials as 
for GDP, is possible for WNDP too (Oulton (2002b)).   
The extent to which we can regard WNDP in practice as a satisfactory welfare measure 
depends on (a) the extent to which actual market prices correspond to true social values and  
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(b) whether or not all relevant capital stocks have been included.  Under (a), we may note that 
the measurement of GDP also relies on market prices reflecting social values.  Under (b), 
apart from land environmental assets are not currently included in the SNA.
12  Nevertheless, 
Weitzman’s analysis shows us the relationship between GDP, a measure of output derived 
from the national accounts as currently constituted,  and WNDP, a measure of sustainability, 
and indicates what would be required statistically in moving from one measure to the other. 
13  
Despite its theoretical importance, Weitzman’s NDP is not generally calculated by 
statistical agencies since it is not formally part of the 1993 System of National Accounts 
(SNA93), nor of the latter’s European formulation (ESA95).  In the United Kingdom for 
example, it is possible to derive net domestic product at 2000 basic prices from published 
series.
14  And the ONS publishes ‘net national disposable income at 2000 market prices’.  
This concept equals GDP at 2000 market prices adjusted for fixed capital consumption, net 
income from abroad, and for gains or losses on the terms of trade.  But in both these cases, 
investment, imports and government expenditure are valued in their own base year prices, not 
in consumption units.  However, whether or not the ONS itself chose to publish estimates of 
WNDP, implementation of the growth accounting framework would enable anyone who 
wanted to to do so.   
 
 
5.  Barriers to Implementing the Growth Accounting Framework 
 
Any researcher currently seeking to implement the growth accounting framework using 
official data runs into a number of difficulties, ranging from the mundane to deeper 
conceptual and measurement issues.  These can be illustrated by reference to the Bank of 
England Industry Dataset (BEID) that did attempt to implement the framework:  see Oulton 
and Srinivasan (2003b).  The first issue is the number of industries that it is possible to 
distinguish, 34 in the case of the BEID.  Of these, 18 fall in the production sector (including 
11 in manufacturing), 3 in public services, but only 13 in private services which now 
accounts for half of GDP.  It would have been possible to distinguish more industries in 
                                                 
12   ESA95 recognised “mineral oil exploration” as a type of gross investment but depletion of oil fields is not 
counted as a form of depreciation.   
13   See Crafts (2002) for a discussion of some of the wider issues, including changes in life expectancy, 
involved in measuring real national income.   
14   This is ‘gross value added at 2000 basic prices’ [ABMM] minus ‘fixed capital consumption at 2000 prices’ 
[YBFX].    
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manufacturing, which accounts for less than a fifth of GDP, but not in private services.  This 
statistical imbalance between the production and services sectors was noted in the First 
Report of this Review (Allsopp (2003), chapter 9).   
 
5.1  Mundane difficulties 
 
1.  For analytical purposes we need long runs of data, eg 20-30 years.  But these are hard to 
put together in practice because  
•  The SIC is changed at roughly 10 year intervals and earlier series are not always 
revised to the new basis.  For example, for the Bank of England Industry Dataset 
(BEID), which covered the period 1979-2000, it was necessary  to bridge across the 
1968, 1980 and 1992 SICs.   
•  Some basic official series do not go back very far.  For example, the official 
series for current price value added in communications (ONS code:  QTPP) goes 
back only to 1985, while that for construction (ONS code:  EWSX) goes back only 
to 1989.  The official series for whole economy total weekly hours worked (ONS 
code:  YBUS) goes back only to 1992Q2.   
2.  Some basic economic series are not produced by the ONS and have to be constructed out 
of a variety of sources.  For example, hours worked is not published at the industry level.  So 
for the BEID it was put together from unpublished data on employees by industry (from the 
AES/ABI surveys), grossed up for self-employment (from the Labour Force Survey), and 
multiplied by weekly hours worked per worker (from the New Earnings Survey).   
3.  There are inconsistencies between the levels of aggregation at which different series are 
published.  For example, nominal data on sales and purchases are published in the input-
output tables (also in the supply and use tables) for nowadays 123 industries.  But the 
corresponding price indices are not published at this level, though price indices are in fact 
available at a much more detailed level.   
4.  The asset breakdown for the ONS’s series for investment in fixed assets is poor.  Only 
four types of asset are distinguished:  buildings, “other machinery and equipment”, vehicles, 
and intangibles.  Software investment is included but, bafflingly, is divided half and half 
between intangibles and “other machinery and equipment”.  A much more detailed 
breakdown is available from the supply and use tables, but on a consistent basis only from  
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1992 and only in current prices.  Lack of asset detail would not matter much if asset prices all 
rose at about the same rate, but we know this is far from being the case (see below on ICT).   
 
5.2  Deeper issues 
 
Output and prices in the service sector 
 
It is widely believed that measuring output and prices in services is harder than in goods.  
This issue is discussed in detail in Annex B.  The main problem is not the inherent difficulty 
of measuring service output (though for some industries there are genuine conceptual 
problems) but the absence of true price indices for an important part of service output.  There 
is no equivalent for the service sector of the PPI programme for the production sector, though 
Corporate Services Price Indices are under development.  When true price indices are absent, 
real output has to be measured either by deflating nominal gross output by an inappropriate 
price index such as RPIX (called “rough deflation” in Annex B) or by using an input 
indicator such as employment as a proxy for output (usually adjusted by a guesstimate of 
productivity growth derived from another industry group in which productivity growth is 
easier to measure).  Use of RPIX  to deflate an industry’s output implies that labour 
productivity is assumed to be growing at the same rate as in the sectors to which RPIX 
properly applies (consumer goods and services).  Whether input indicators or rough deflation 
is employed, either way the productivity growth rate is being assumed, not measured.   
  How large then is the proportion of GDP where productivity growth rate is assumed, not 
measured?  For the public sector, this amounted to about 18% of GDP prior to the changes 
introduced in the 1998 Blue Book (the partial adoption of ESA95). For 1986 onwards, this 
figure is now reduced to about 9% of GDP, the remainder being covered by output indicators.  
(Output measurement in the public sector is to be covered by a separate inquiry (the Atkinson 
Review)).  For private services, the proportion where productivity growth is assumed not 
measured comes almost entirely from sections J (Financial intermediation) and K (Real 
estate, renting and business activities) of the 1992 SIC and amounts to about 13% of GDP.   
The contribution of an industry to GDP growth is the growth of industry output multiplied 
by the share of that industry in nominal GDP.  For finance and insurance, even these shares 
are problematic.  The contribution of the financial sector to GDP growth is about half what it 
otherwise would be, because of a negative item called the “Adjustment for financial 
services”.  This arises because profits in the rest of the economy are measured gross of  
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interest payments to financial firms, while the profits of financial firms include their interest 
receipts.  To avoid double counting, the “Adjustment for financial services” is required.  
Under ESA95, profits in the non-financial sector are reduced by the amount that firms pay for 
the services of financial intermediation, so the non-financial sector’s weight in the economy 
will be somewhat lower and the financial sector’s weight will be considerably higher (Begg 
et al (1996)).  However, this part of ESA95 has not as yet been implemented in the UK.  In 
insurance, the weight is measured by premiums net of claims as a proportion of GDP and this 
can be negative.  It was in fact negative for non-life insurance in 1990 and this meant that 
while 1990 weights were being used, any growth in the non-life insurance industry had the 




In most countries, including the UK, capital stocks are estimated by the Perpetual Inventory 
Model (PIM).  That is to say, for each type of asset the stock is estimated by cumulating 
flows of gross investment, then subtracting retirements at the end of what is believed to be 
the service life, and finally (in the case of so-called “net stock” estimates) allowing for 
depreciation on older but still surviving assets.  Empirically, estimates of capital stocks are 
bedevilled by two major areas of uncertainty.  The first relates to the service lives of assets.  
Second, there is the choice of the appropriate pattern of depreciation:  should we use for 
example geometric, hyperbolic, “light bulb” (also called “one-hoss shay”), or straight-line 
(the ONS uses the last of these)? 
15 
Little is known about the service life of assets in the United Kingdom.  Till 1983, the 
official estimates of the capital stock were based on the work of Redfern (1955) and Dean 
(1964); see also Griffin (1976).  Their estimates of services lives were in turn based on the life 
lengths used by the Inland Revenue for tax purposes, from a period before the tax system 
encouraged business firms to depreciate assets more rapidly in their accounts than would be 
justified by true economic lives (Inland Revenue (1953)).  In 1983, the Central Statistical 
Office (the predecessor of the ONS) revised the service lives downwards, citing (unpublished) 
“discussions with manufacturers” as its authority (Central Statistical Office (1985), page 201).  
                                                 
15   Estimates of capital stocks are needed for balance sheet analysis but for measuring productivity we need 
estimates of capital services:  the distinction between these two concepts of capital is extensively discussed in 
OECD (2001b) and in Oulton and Srinivasan (2003a).  At the moment, the ONS publishes only stock estimates 
as official statistics.  But the empirical requirements for estimating stocks and services are very similar, so I do 
not labour the distinction here.    
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Following a report commissioned from the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (Mayes and Young (1994)), this reduction was reversed.  But at the same time two 
other changes were introduced.  First, a  new category of asset, “numerically-controlled 
machinery”, was introduced into the ONS’s Perpetual Inventory Model (PIM) of the capital 
stock.  This type of asset is assumed to have only 40% of the service life of other types of 
plant and machinery (Vaze et al (2003)).  Second, some plant and machinery is assumed to be 
scrapped prematurely;  the rate of scrapping is assumed to be related to the corporate 
insolvency rate, which has been on a rising trend since the 1970s.   
Clearly then the empirical evidence for service lives in the United Kingdom is weak.
16  
This judgment is confirmed by the OECD.  In its capital stock manual  (OECD (2001b), 
Appendix 3) it lists four countries (not including the United Kingdom) for which service lives 
“appear to be based on information that is generally more reliable than is usually available for 
other countries”:  the United States, Canada, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands.  It is 
noteworthy that in each of these countries service lives are lower than assumed in the United 
Kingdom for both buildings and plant and machinery (at least before the effects of premature 
scrapping are considered).   
The empirical evidence for depreciation rates in the UK is even weaker that that for 
service lives.  The most extensive research o n depreciation has been done for the United 
States, though even here the evidence is patchy and much of it is out of date.
17  Consequently, 
most independent researchers apply the US rates to the UK, possibly adjusting for assumed 
differences in service lives between the two countries.   
No international consensus has yet been reached on the appropriate assumption to make 
about depreciation (OECD (2001b)).  In practice, a variety of approaches has been used.  In 
the United States, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces estimates of the “productive 
capital stock”, ie aggregate capital services, that assume a hyperbolic pattern of decay rates, 
arguing that these are more realistic than geometric decay.  The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics follows a similar approach (Australian Bureau of Statistics (2001)).  But this pattern 
is not based on any strong empirical evidence.  Statistics Canada on the other hand uses 
geometric decay.  The BEA does not estimate capital services but does produce wealth 
measures of the capital stock using geometric depreciation (Fraumeni (1997); Herman 
(2000)).  Academic researchers have tended to assume geometric depreciation, eg Jorgenson 
                                                 
16   Knowledge may be improved if the results of the ONS’s capital stock survey are published (West and 
Clifton-Fearnside (1999)).  However, the survey was mainly confined to manufacturing and has now been 
discontinued.   
17   The U.S. evidence is reviewed in Fraumeni (1997); see also Oulton and Srinivasan (2003a).    
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and his various collaborators in numerous studies (eg Jorgenson et al (1987); Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000a) and (2000b)).  By contrast the ONS in common with many other national 
statistical agencies employs straight-line depreciation in their “net stock” estimates.   
Recently, the ONS has revised the PIM so that the underlying data are now consistent 
with the national accounts and there are also some improvements in the model (Vaze et al 
(2003)).  An experimental index of capital services has also been published (Vaze (2003)).  
But significant weaknesses remain.  First, as just noted, the estimates are not based on firm 
empirical evidence about service lives or depreciation rates.  Second, the underlying 
investment data are only disaggregated into a small number of asset types, currently nine:  
 
1.  Industrial and commercial buildings 
2.  Dwellings 
3.  Plant and machinery (excluding items 4 and 5) 
4.  Computer- and numerically-controlled plant 
5.  Computers 
6.  Vehicles 
7.  Artistic originals 
8.  Mineral exploration 
9.  Software  
 
By contrast, the US capital stock estimates are based on more than 50 asset types (see 
below).  Lack of disaggregation has a large impact on the estimates when the prices of assets 
are changing rapidly relative to the average (Oulton and Srinivasan (2003a)).  This is the case 
of course with computers, so separating them out is a step in the right direction.  But the 
effect of doing so is greatly reduced in the revised UK PIM since the same deflator is 
employed for computers as for plant and machinery as a whole.  Computers are not the only 
example of assets with rapidly changing relative prices.  Others are telecommunications 
equipment and numerous other hi-tech products where semiconductors are important 




Whatever one thinks about the New Economy, the measurement of ICT outputs and inputs is 
likely to remain a crucial issue for many years.  It seems likely that there are differences  
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between Europe and the US in the way that the same methodology, the 1993 SNA, is being 
applied and even differences between European countries (Lequiller (2001)).  However, there 
is no doubt that at the moment the US statistical agencies are considerably in advance of the 
ONS in the measurement of ICT, though to be fair the rest of the EU generally lags as far 
behind.  It has been known for some while that the evolution of official price indices for 
computers differs widely across countries.  Most observers have judged the differences to be 
much too great to be plausible reflections of genuine differences between countries, given 
that computers are widely traded internationally (Schreyer (2002)).  Outside analysts 
invariably use the US price (adjusted for exchange rate changes), whichever country they are 
studying.  Other countries’ (including the UK’s) domestic PPIs for computers have up to now 
not carried conviction.   
The correct measurement of ICT is of critical importance to the analysis of productivity 
growth, since applying US methods and price indices to ICT raises the growth rate of the 
UK’s GDP and also raises substantially the contribution of capital to economic growth, while 
reducing that of TFP; (Oulton (2001b) and (2002a); Oulton and Srinivasan (2003b); see also 
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003)).   
  One reason that the US is statistically in advance of the UK is simply that it started 
earlier.  The officially-sponsored study which led to the incorporation of a h edonic price 
index for computers into the US NIPAs was Cole et al (1986).  Ironically, this was preceded 
by a pioneering study by Stoneman (1976) for the UK.  Stoneman’s analysis suggested, again 
on the basis of hedonic analysis, that the UK’s official PPI for computers was overstating 
price change by some 10 percentage points per annum.  But this work was ignored and only 
recently has the ONS adopted hedonic methods for the PPI for computers (Ball and Allen 
(2003)).   
Computer prices are important but they are far from the only issue.  Concentration on 
computer prices may have masked more pressing problems in software.  In the US software 
investment is much larger than investment in all types of computer.  So it seems we should be 
at least as concerned with measuring the level and growth of software stocks as with those of 
computer stocks.  But here we have a puzzle.  In the UK the official series for current price 
software investment shows it to be much smaller than computer investment.  In earlier work 
done at the Bank of England (Oulton (2001b)), I questioned this, arguing that the 1991 survey 
to which up to now the official series has been pegged yields quite a different conclusion.  
The UK also appears to be out of line with other European countries.  Lequiller (2001) has 
compared France with the US.  He finds that the ratio of software investment to IT equipment  
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investment was about the same in the two countries in 1998 (his page 25 and chart 5). He also 
finds that the ratio of software investment to intermediate consumption of IT services is 
substantially lower in France than in the US (page 26-27).  This ratio is exceptionally high in 
the US, but equally his chart 6 shows that it is exceptionally low in the UK.  In fact, the 
reported UK ratio is substantially lower than in France, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany.  
These considerations led me to conclude that the level of software investment in the UK 
should be multiplied by a factor of at least three, adding about 1% to the level of GDP at the 
end of the century.  There is now an opportunity to settle this issue since the results from the 
recent SERVCOM survey are now available, though not as yet fully published (Prestwood 
(2001)).   
An even bigger gap in our statistical knowledge relates to software prices.  There is no 
official price index for software in the UK and so far as I am aware no programme to create 
one.  (The US has a price index for pre-packaged software, one third of the total, but as yet no 
price indices for the other two thirds, custom and own account software:  see Parker and 
Grimm (2000)).  In the UK national accounts, software investment is deflated by a price 
index based on computer programmers’ wages, with a guesstimated allowance for 
programmers’ productivity.   
We also have no data for the UK on the average service lives of computers and software.  
A survey focused on ICT service lives, perhaps concentrated on the industries which are the 
heavy users (wholesale and retail trade; finance and business services), would seem to be a 
relatively straightforward way of making progress here.   
 
Other measurement issues 
 
1.  Computer and software prices are not the only areas of concern even in ICT.  It seems 
likely that measuring prices for many types of hi-tech equipment, such as telecoms and 
medical equipment, requires a similar approach.  The matched models method commonly 
used by national statistical agencies, including the ONS, may yield systematically biased 
results, though the direction of bias is not necessarily upwards.  In the US, it is expected that 
hedonic methods will be applied more and more widely (Moulton (2001)).   
2.  Technical progress in semiconductors appears to lie at the heart of technical progress in 
computers, telecommunications equipment, and many other types of machinery.  The quality-
adjusted prices of semiconductors have been falling extraordinarily rapidly; from 1995-2000,  
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the price of integrated circuits (microprocessors and memory chips) fell at between 36 and 
56% per annum in the US; microprocessor prices fell at over 50% per annum (Aizcorbe et al 
(2000; Aizcorbe (2002)).  Semiconductors are an intermediate good, so on the expenditure 
side they largely drop out, their effect showing up in the prices of the goods in which they are 
incorporated.  But they still h ave some effect on GDP(E) unless the semiconductors trade 
balance is zero.  Even a small trade balance can have a significant effect on GDP because of 
the extreme size of the price change.  On the output side there is the potential for a much 
larger effect since the UK semiconductor industry is not negligible.  So getting the 
semiconductor price right is important.   
3.  The 1993 SNA, from which ESA95 derives, treats expenditure on software as a form of 
investment for the first time.  But strangely, it continues to regard R&D expenditure as a 
current expense (intermediate consumption).  This makes little sense.  It would be highly 
desirable for the ONS to produce estimates of R&D expenditure for each industry on the 
same basis as other types of investment; at the moment published R&D spending is only 
broken down into 11 industry groups (Morgan (2003), Table 8).  Then researchers could 
estimate R&D stocks and if desired incorporate these into the growth accounting framework.  
There is no need to wait until some future revision of the SNA mandates that R&D be treated 
as an investment.   
 
 
6.  Economic Statistics in the United States 
 
The feasibility of employing the growth accounting framework can be assessed in part by 
looking at what other statistical agencies do.  Here I concentrate on practice in the United 
States.   
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes estimates of value added in 
current prices (“Gross Product Originating” or “GDP by industry”) for 72 industries covering 
the whole economy; the sum of value added across industries, plus a statistical discrepancy, 
equals GDP.  The BEA also estimates chained-volume indices of the growth of each 
industry’s real value added; these are calculated by double deflation (Yuskavage (1996)).  
Like the ONS, the BEA believes the expenditure estimate of GDP, both in current prices and  
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in chained volume terms, to be more reliable than the output one.
18  Its reasons were stated by 
Yuskavage (1996) as follows:   
 
“The amount of detailed expenditures data that are available for weighting the price 
indexes used in calculating GDP [ie, GDP(E)] is greater than that for gross outputs and 
intermediate inputs used in calculating GPO [ie, GDP(O)], and little information is 
collected annually on the composition of inputs or of non-manufacturing outputs.”   
 
To make the two estimates of GDP agree, the BEA adds a statistical discrepancy to the 
output estimate.  From 1995-2001 this has ranged between plus 0.4% and minus 1.4% of 
current price GDP(E), averaging about minus 0.3%.  In growth rate terms, there is also a 
statistical discrepancy which averaged virtually zero over the period 1978-94, though ranging 
from –0.9  to +1.2 percentage points per annum in individual years (Yuskavage (1996), Table 
2).  The discrepancy is believed to be located in the private sector, not the government.  
Unlike the ONS, the BEA does not constrain the private sector growth rates of output so that 
the aggregate of private sector and government growth equals that of GDP(E), but instead is 
content to reconcile the two estimates of GDP growth by adding a statistical discrepancy.     
The BEA also publishes estimates of the capital stock held by broad sectors ( U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1999); Herman (2000)).  These are calculated by the perpetual 
inventory method.  In the private sector some 28 types of equipment are separately 
distinguished, plus 21 types of non-residential, and seven types of residential structures.  For 
nearly all asset types depreciation is geometric with the rates deduced from studies of second 
hand asset prices (Fraumeni (1997); Oulton and Srinivasan (2003a)).   
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) first published estimates of TFP growth in 
1983, covering the period 1948-81.  (The BLS uses the term multifactor productivity (MFP), 
but the concept is the same as TFP). Currently it publishes TFP growth estimates for broad 
aggregates like private business and manufacturing and also at a more detailed level, eg for 
20 2-digit manufacturing industries and for 108 3-digit manufacturing industries.  In addition, 
it publishes comparisons between US, German and French TPF growth.  The more detailed 
estimates employ the so-called KLEMS approach:  the growth of real gross output (not value 
added) is accounted for by the growth of capital (K), labour (L), energy (E), materials (M) 
and business services (S).  Capital input is measured by aggregate capital services, not by the 
capital stock.  The capital services estimate is built up from the same underlying data as the 
BEA’s stock estimates,  though the BLS assumes that the services of capital assets decay 
                                                 
18   Confusingly, it calls the output side estimate the income estimate.    
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hyperbolically, not geometrically.  Labour input is measured by hours worked, adjusted for 
qualifications, age and sex.  Inputs of energy, materials and services are measured by deflated 
purchases, at a detailed level.   
 
 
7.  Conclusions:  the Need for Joined-Up Statistics 
 
Growth accounting provides, I would argue, a very fruitful way of looking at the changing 
structure of the economy, and assessing the contribution of each sector or industry to the 
whole.  It also provides a very useful framework for the collection of economic statistics.  
This approach might be called “joined-up statistics”.  The advantages of this approach have 
long been recognised in the US, where the BEA and the BLS routinely supply the kind of 
productivity statistics for which I am arguing here.   
At the moment, the ONS does not provide this service to users, nor does it supply the raw 
materials that would enable outsiders readily to create their own statistics.  What of the future 
under current plans?  The ONS does have a productivity programme, but so far it has 
concentrated on labour productivity and progress has been slow.  The Corporate Services 
Prices programme promises one day to improve the measurement of prices and real output in 
services but again progress has been slow and the hardest sectors have yet to be covered.  The 
ONS does have a programme for measuring real value added by double deflation, the 
Constant Price Input Output (KPIO) programme, but this has as yet not been incorporated 
into the national accounts process.  The Capital Stocks Survey might have increased our 
knowledge of asset lives, but this has been discontinued with only part of manufacturing 
covered.   
In my view, the ONS ought to adopt the growth accounting approach as the framework 
for their economic statistics.  This is just an extension of the SNA which lies behind the 
national accounts and is now well sanctioned by international organisations, eg the OECD 
and the European Commission.  As a part of this, the ONS should expand its input-output 
programme and integrate it with their ongoing PPI and CSPI programmes, ie reactivate their 
KPIO programme.  This would enable them in due course to produce estimates of double 
deflated value added.  The latter would in turn increase the coherence of the national accounts 
and greatly assist in the analysis of productivity.    
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In summary, the analysis above suggests the following action programme for the ONS in 
order to implement fully the growth accounting framework:   
 
1.  Improve the measurement of real output in the services sector by completing the 
Corporate Services Price Index programme, so that it covers the hard-to-measure 
industries like banking, insurance and business services (particularly legal, accounting 
and consultancy services).   
 
2.  Rebalance coverage of the national economy so as to allow greater disaggregation of 
private services.  This might largely follow from success under point 1.   
 
3.  Introduce double deflation into the national accounts.  That is, continue with and 
complete the “constant price input output” (KPIO) programme and make it an integral 
part of the national accounts process.  The First Report of this Review (Allsopp 
(2003), paragraph 6.10) recommended use of the output (or production) approach for 
estimating regional GDP.  Adoption of double deflation would be consistent with this.   
 
4.  Widen the use of hedonic methods for price measurement in hi-tech areas where such 
methods are likely to make a substantial difference, eg software, telecommunications, 
and semiconductors.   
 
5.  Commission or carry out research on the service lives of different types of capital and 
on their patterns of depreciation.   
 
6.  Commission or carry out research on the level of software investment, to establish 
whether the very large difference between the UK and the US is correct or an artefact.   
 
7.  Integrate statistics on employment (and better still, hours worked), output, prices, 
investment, and R&D so that all are published on a common industrial breakdown.  
Maintain the continuity of this breakdown even when the SIC is changed.   
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Annex A:  The Growth Accounting Framework 
 
A.1  Accounting relationships 
 
We start by defining some accounting relationships at the industry level.  For simplicity we 
assume a closed economy but the argument is easily extended to an open one.  Value added 





= =-= ￿           (A.1) 
 
where  i Y  is real gross output,  ij X  is the real quantity of output supplied to industry  i by 
industry j, and  i p  is the price of industry i’s output.  Here we have split up nominal value 
added conceptually into the product of the price of value added  ) ( iV p and the quantity  ) ( i V .   











ŁłŁł ￿         (A.2) 
 
Here a “hat” denotes a growth rate or more precisely a logarithmic derivative with respect to 
time, eg   ˆ log/. ii VdVdt =   Equation  (A.2) gives the double deflated growth rate of value 
added.   
Gross output can be sold either to final demand ( i E ) or for intermediate use:   
 
,1,..., iiji j YEXin =+= ￿                (A.3) 
 





= =￿                    (A.4) 
 
where V is aggregate real value added and  V p  is the price of aggregate value added (ie the 
price of GDP).    
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= =￿                     (A.5) 
 
where E is real GDP from the expenditure side and  E p  is the corresponding price index.  The 
first task is to check that GDP(O) equals GDP(E) in current prices.
 19  Solving (A.3) for  i E , 










      (A.6) 
 
Hence 
VE pVpE =                       (A.7) 
 
A.2  The growth rate of real GDP 
 
In continuous time, the growth of nominal value added  () V pV  is the growth of the price of 
value added plus the growth of the quantity of value added:   V pV ˆ ˆ + , and this must equal the 
growth rate of the right hand side of (A.4).  By totally differentiating (A.4) with respect to 





i iV i V p s p




i i iV s V
1
ˆ ˆ    
 
where the  i s  are the (observable) shares of each industry in aggregate nominal value added:   
                                                 
19   Typically, output is measured at basic prices and expenditure at purchasers’ prices, but we are abstracting 
from taxes on expenditure here.    
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The growth rates of real GDP and of the price of GDP from the expenditure side are 
given by  
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We now show that  ˆˆ EV =  and consequently, from equation (A.7), that  ˆˆ EV pp = .  First 
note that the growth of any component of final demand can be written (by differentiating 











Łł Łł ￿       (A.9) 
 
Plugging this into the definition of the growth rate of GDP(E), equation (A.8):   
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ˆˆˆ (using (A.7))
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Hence also from (A.7)  
 
ˆˆ EV pp =  
 
We can therefore pick a common reference period in which we set  . 1 = = E V p p   Hence in 
the reference period  VE = , from (A.7).  But since the growth rates are equal, it follows that 
E V p p =  and  E V =  in all periods, not just the reference period.   
The usual alternative to using double deflated value added is to proxy it by real gross 
output, with the growth of GDP(O) still being estimated using value added weights (“single  
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deflation”).  It is clear from equation (A.2) that this will not in general yield the same answer; 
in fact it will only do so if real gross output is growing at the same rate as real intermediate 
input.  So when single deflation is employed the growth of GDP(O) will not in general equal 
that of GDP(E).   
 
A.3  The growth of TFP 
 
The production function for industry i is:   
 
  12 (,,,,...,,)
i
iiiiiin YfKLXXXt =  
 
where  i K  is capital and  i L  is labour used by the ith industry.  Here we assume just one type 
of capital and one type of labour but there is no difficulty in extending the argument to many 
types.  TFP growth ( i m ) is defined as the rate at which the frontier is shifting outwards, i.e. 
the rate at which output is growing with inputs held constant:   
 
  log/ ii Yt m =¶¶  
 
As is well known, under the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to 












ŁłŁłŁł ￿   (A.10) 
 
Here  K p  is the rental price of capital and  L p  is the wage rate of labour.  We also have the 
accounting identity that the value of output equals returns to the inputs (including profit):   
 
  ,1,..., iiLiKijij j pYpLpKpXin =++= ￿  
 
Differentiating both sides of this identity and using (A.10),  
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ŁłŁłŁł ºß ￿    (A.11) 
 
Equation (A.11) shows the dual method of estimating TFP growth, employing prices instead 
of quantities.  In principle, it yields exactly the same answer as the primal method of equation 
(A.10) provided that the statistics of prices and quantities are consistent with each other, ie 
that the accounting identity is satisfied.   











                (A.12) 
 
where  i i KK =￿  and  i i LL =￿ .  Under the assumptions of perfect competition and 
constant returns to scale, the Solow residual measures the rate at which the aggregate 
production possibility frontier is shifting out (Hulten (1978)).  The relationship between the 










Łł ￿                      (A.13) 
 
Proof.    Substitute from (A.10) into (A.13) and use (A.2).   
 
Here  / iiV pYpV is the Domar weight for industry i.  This result assumes that a given input 
is paid the same price whichever industry it is employed in.  If this is not the case, then the 
relationship between the aggregate TFP growth rate and the industry ones is more complex, 
involving reallocation effects (Jorgenson et al (1987)).
20   
Finally, the Divisia index numbers derived above assume continuous time.  In practice, 
index numbers must be estimated in discrete time, where chain indices are the empirical 
counterpart to Divisia ones.  This means that the attractive duality between index numbers for 
prices and for quantities may have to be given up.  For example, if both price and quantity 
indices are chained Laspeyres, then the accounting identities will not be satisfied.  The 
                                                 
20   See Oulton (2001b) for further discussion and also on the relationship between industry-level TFP on a 
value added basis as opposed to (as here) on a gross output one.    
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accounting identities can always be satisfied if price indices are defined as implicit deflators, 
but then the price indices may lack some desirable properties.
21   
 
 
Annex B:  The Measurement of Output and Prices in the Service Sector 
 
B.1   Introduction 
 
The purpose of this Annex is to describe the methods currently used by the Office for 
National Statistics for measuring real gross output in services and to give some indication of 
their accuracy, insofar as this is possible.
22   
  Measuring output and prices in services is widely believed to be more difficult than in 
goods.  As the share of services in output is rising, there is a risk that the quality of the 
national income statistics could fall (Griliches (1994)).  The Office for National Statistics 
measures output in constant prices in a large number of industries as part of its programme 
for constructing an estimate of GDP in constant prices from the output side.  Table 1 lists the 
ten sections of the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC92) which cover the service 
sector.  Of these ten, three fall largely within the public sector (L, M and N).  These 
accounted for 18% of GDP in 1995.  The other seven sections (G-K, O and P) may be 
broadly described as market services and accounted for 52% of 1995 GDP.
23  So services in 
total accounted for 70% of GDP.   
  The measurement of real output is of course intimately linked to that of prices.  The ONS 
has two large price gathering programmes covering retail prices (the RPI) and producer 
prices (the PPI).  Wherever possible, the ONS tends to use current price gross output deflated 
by an appropriate price index to measure real output.  But one of the difficulties it faces is 
that for many services no price data are currently collected or even exist.  For example, for 
most services provided by the government, no price is charged.  But in addition, the PPI only 
cover goods and very few prices are collected covering corporate services (services provided 
by one set of businesses to another set).  This sector now accounts for nearly a quarter of 
                                                 
21   Eurostat has decided that volumes should be measured by chain-weighted Laspeyres indices, so the 
corresponding implicit deflator is chain-weighted Paasche.  The US NIPAs employ Fisher quantity indices, 
which means that the corresponding implicit deflator is also Fisher.   
22   See OECD (1987) for a general survey of methods.   
23   The utilities (electricity, gas and water) are classified to the production sector, although in the RPI their 
products are counted as services.   
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GDP.  A third major programme of p rice collection, which will lead eventually to a 
Corporate Services Price Index, is now underway but is currently far from complete (Skipper 
(1998); Palmer (2000)).   
  The next section discusses the different ways in which real output is measured in practice.  
Then section 3 considers the effect of some current or forthcoming methodological 
improvements.  Section 4 looks at some conceptual problems which affect the measurement 
of service sector output, including single deflation bias which is discussed more fully in the 
Appendix.  Section 5 considers the likely size of any errors of measurement and section 6 
concludes.   
 
B.2  Methods of measuring gross output 
 
The ONS uses four methods to estimate output in constant prices (Sharp (1998)).  These may 
be termed:  
 
1. Input indicators 
2. Rough deflation 
3. Output indicators  
4. Precise deflation 
 
1.  Input indicators  Output is measured by input, eg numbers employed or the wage bill 
deflated by an index of earnings.  The deflated wage bill is better since it allows for changes 
in the skill mix, but it is still only a measure of input, not output.  Frequently, the input 
measure is adjusted by an assumed productivity growth rate.   
An example of this method is Libraries, archives and museums (925).  Here output is 
measured (mostly) by the number of local authority employees in these activities, adjusted for 
trends in local authority wages and salaries in constant prices.  In this case, no allowance for 
productivity growth is made.   
Private services industries where productivity-adjusted employment is used as the output 
measure accounted for 3% of GDP in 1990, down from 6% in 1980 (Sharp (1998)).  But the 
productivity adjustment is also applied to industries where rough deflation is the method and 
these form a much larger proportion of GDP. 
  
  31 
2.  Rough deflation  I call it rough deflation when turnover is deflated by a price index 
which is not appropriate to the industry.  For example, in most of Section K (Real estate, 
renting and business activities) output is measured by turnover deflated partly by the RPIX 
and partly by the earnings index for this sector, the latter adjusted for assumed productivity 
growth.  The reason is that no true price indices currently exist for most of this sector, so the 
implicit assumption is made either that prices rise at the same rate as the RPIX or that they 
rise at the same rate as the productivity-adjusted earnings index.   
How is the assumed productivity growth rate derived?  “The present method of assessing 
productivity change in the [private] service industries is to compare the output and 
employment series for all services industries where employment is NOT used as an output 
proxy.  A productivity adjustment is calculated from this comparison which is then applied to 
those services industries where employment is used as an output proxy.” (Sharp (1998), page 
14, capitalisation in original).  In other words, the ONS calculates productivity growth for 
services industries where it thinks that this can be done reasonably well (in practice, hotels 
and restaurants, and transport and communications) and applies the resulting estimate to 
sectors where productivity cannot be calculated, primarily to industries within finance and 
business services.
24  An overall cap of 4% p.a. is placed on the assumed rate.   
 
3.  Output indicators    An output indicator is a quantity or volume measure which is 
assumed to be representative of (part of) an industry’s output.  Usually several are employed 
for a particular industry, weighted together by each indicator’s share in costs or revenues.  
For example, the output of the postal service (6411) is a weighted average of 11 output 
indicators, of which the two with the largest weights are the numbers of 1st class and 2nd 
class letters.   
 
4.  Precise deflation    I use this term when turnover has been deflated by an index which 
is fully appropriate to the industry.  For example, the output of “Hairdressing and other 
beauty treatment” (9302) is turnover deflated by the RPI for hairdressing.  I also use the term 
when turnover is deflated by the implicit deflator for the relevant category of consumers’ 
expenditure or when deflated consumers’ expenditure is the output measure.  In the case of 
                                                 
24   A complication is that the adjustment is also based on the relationship between that part of output in these 
sectors which the ONS considers can be measured and employment. For example, in banking part of output is 
deflated loans and deposits. This is then compared with the whole of employment in banking (since the ONS 
does not know what proportion of employment is related to this part of banking output). The productivity 
adjustment estimated in this way is then applied, amongst other industries, to the part of banking output 
represented by banking employment.   
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retail trade, the output measure is the volume of sales which is based on detailed deflation by 
components of the RPI.  In all these cases, appropriate components of the RPI are being used 
as deflators.  In the case of wholesale trade, the appropriate producer price index (PPI) is 
generally employed and this too is classed as precise deflation.  Finally the small number of 
cases where the new Corporate Services Price Indices (see below) are used to deflate turnover 
are also classed as precise deflation (eg Freight transport by road, 6024).   
“Precise deflation” does not mean that the output measure is necessarily accurate.  That of 
course depends on the accuracy of the underlying price indices.  Even if the indices are 
perfect, there may be conceptual problems in interpreting the meaning of the results (see 
below).   
Frequently, several methods are used simultaneously in a given industry.  For example, 
the output of banking (6511 & 6512/1) is measured using a combination of input indicators, 
output indicators, and rough deflation.  The input indicator is a head count of employees in 
Great Britain, adjusted for assumed productivity growth, which receives a weight of 23%.  
The quantity indicators are the number (not the value) of clearings — credits and debits — 
with a weight of 13%.  The third element is the stocks of loans and deposits, deflated mostly 
by the RPIX, with a weight of 64%.  This last element is an example of rough deflation.  
Presumably, in addition to the ability to transmit and receive funds (measured by clearings), 
bank customers receive a flow of services proportional to the stock of loans or deposits but 
the price of such services is not measured.  Hence the unknown price is assumed to rise at the 
same rate as the RPIX.   
Precise deflation (ie deflation by true price indices) is usually argued to be theoretically 
the best method.  But output indicators may be a reasonable, practical alternative when the 
product is fairly homogeneous and the indicators are comprehensive.  This is the case with 
the postal service where the indicators correspond well with the main services provided, 
including as they do different qualities of service (eg 1st and 2nd class letter post).  Similarly, 
with freight transport, tonne kilometres may be a reasonable measure, especially when broken 
down by type of commodity carried,
25 although obviously this will not capture dimensions 
like reliability, punctuality and frequency.  Outside of services, quantity indicators are used to 
measure output in gas and water (section E) and in mining and quarrying (section C).  In 
manufacturing, constant price output is measured in nearly all cases by nominal gross output 
deflated by the appropriate PPI.   
                                                 
25  For rail transport, the ONS uses a breakdown into coal and coke, iron and steel, and “other”.   
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The relative importance of the different methods 
 
Table 1 shows the proportions of each service sector’s output which were estimated by the 
four different methods, prior to the methodological changes made in the 1998 Blue Book.  
This table uses an earlier version of the ONS’s methodological guide (Sharp (1998)), which 
has subsequently been revised in the light of the 1998 changes (Sharp (2003)).
26  In 1995 
prices, services (excluding the utilities) accounted for 74% of GDP.
27  Overall, 44% of 
service output (30% of GDP) is estimated by precise deflation, 16% by rough deflation, 11% 
by output indicators and 29% by input indicators.  But the shares of each method differ 
widely between the sectors.   
In sections G-I, O and P, precise deflation is used to measure 70-100% of output.  (The 
term “precise deflation” may give a misleading impression of accuracy in hotels and 
restaurants and in transport since use of the RPI is strictly only correct when households are 
the customers.  Some of the output is in fact sold to business.) But precise deflation is not 
used at all in the public sector (sections L-N) and plays a much smaller role in finance and 
business services (J and K).   
Output indicators play a small role overall but account for around a quarter of output in 
trade, transport and communications, and finance (sections G, I and J).   
Input indicators are shown as dominating in the public sector (L-N) but the 1998 Blue 
Book introduced some important changes (see section 3 below).  In health, education and 
social security, output indicators are now employed in their place.  These changes affected 
about half of output in the public sector; this proportion has now risen to about 70%.  But 
they have only been carried back to 1986, so the earlier methodology is still relevant.    
45% of output in section K (Real estate, renting and business activities) is shown as 
precisely deflated.  But this is rather misleading since nearly all of the precisely deflated part 
is rent arising from the letting of dwellings (counted as part of Division 70, Real estate 
activities).  And most of this is the imputed rent of owner occupiers.  “Business activities” 
                                                 
26   The 2003 version became available too late to be employed here, but doing so would probably not change 
the picture much.   
27   This total is gross of the so-called “Adjustment for financial services”, equal to 4.02% of GDP in 1995. 
Under the 1968 SNA, income earned by financial institutions from the difference between borrowing and 
lending rates is treated as intermediate consumption purchased by a fictitious industry. Since profits in other 
industries are gross of interest payments, this is necessary in order to avoid double counting. Under the 1993 
SNA and ESA95, most though not all of the adjustment will be apportioned to and netted off each industry’s 
value added in the non-financial sector. The remainder however, about 2% of GDP, which represents sales of 
intermediation services to final demand (households, government and net exports) will show as an increase in 
GDP when ESA95 is fully adopted  by the UK (Begg et al. (1996)).   
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fall almost entirely into the rough deflation category.  Business activities comprise the 
following divisions (with SIC92 code in brackets):  
 
•  Computer and related activities (72) 
•  Research and development (73) 
•  Other business activities (74) 
 
The most important activities within the last category are legal services, accountancy, market 
research, advertising, management consultancy, architectural and engineering services, labour 
recruitment, and “other”.  Altogether, business activities have a weight of 8.6% in GDP.  
With the rent element excluded, section K as a whole accounts for 11.1% of GDP.   
Perhaps the most important summary statistic is the proportion of GDP where the 
productivity growth rate is assumed, not measured.  This is the proportion of GDP estimated 
either by rough deflation or by input indicators.  For the public sector, this amounted to about 
18% of GDP prior to the changes introduced in the 1998 Blue Book.  For 1986 onwards, this 
figure is reduced to about 9% of GDP (see below).  For private services, the proportion where 
productivity growth is assumed comes almost entirely from sections J and K and amounts to 
12.5% of 1990 GDP (as can be calculated from Table 1).   
 
B.3  Methodological developments 
 
Corporate Services Price Index (CSPI) 
 
The development of this new set of indices is described in Skipper (1998) and Palmer (2000).  
The CSPI aims to do for corporate services what the PPI does for the production sector.  
Corporate services make up around 23% of GDP, a little more than manufacturing.  They 
include parts of sections H, I, J, K and O of the 1992 SIC.  Data collection for the new series 
began in 1992.  20 indices are currently published; two more are collected but not published 
for disclosure reasons.  Another 24 are “under development” (Palmer (2000), Annex 1).  
Originally, it was planned that the published series should cover “most of the sector by early 
2001”.  But at the moment finance and insurance are not covered at all and there is no target 
date for their inclusion.    
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The development of the CSPI is hampered by some practical problems, many of them 
springing from the absence of anything like the old Census of Production in the services 
sector.  This means that the ONS frequently does not have sufficiently detailed knowledge of 
the nominal value of sales of different services, due i n part to the absence of a detailed 
product code for services.  This means that even if prices are collected for a representative 
range of services, the weights necessary to aggregate them to the industry or sectoral level 
may be missing.  So it will be difficult for the CSPI to match the depth of coverage of the 




The 1998 Blue Book introduced a revised treatment of part of the government sector, 
covering health, education, and social security.  The new methodology is briefly explained in 
Caplan (1998); see also Pritchard (2002).  Instead of input indicators, output indicators are 
used.  The new methodology applies only to the figurers from 1986 onwards.  It is estimated 
to have raised the growth rate of GDP between 1986 and 1997 by an average of 0.04% per 
annum.   
In the case of health, the new indicators seem to be mostly activities, eg consultations, 
prescriptions, and sight tests, weighted together by cost shares.  In social security, the 
indicator is claims: the number of claims under each of the 12 most important benefits, again 
weighted together by cost shares.  In education, the indicator is number of pupils in the 
various educational stages.   
Within education, an additional factor of 0.25% per annum has been added to the output 
of schools to take account of improvements in educational quality; the evidence cited to 
justify this is the rise in GCSE scores.  On the other hand no such quality improvement is 
allowed in health.  In fact it is not clear how different the new health measures are from input 
indicators.  If a doctor sees the same number of patients a year, his output will be counted as 
constant, irrespective of the quality of the treatment he dispenses.  Yet health is one area 
where there seems incontrovertible evidence of quality improvement.  One well studied 
example is treatment for cataracts, which is nowadays a routine outpatient affair but which 
not so long ago involved an elaborate and expensive operation.   
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B.4  Conceptual problems 
 
There are some deep-seated conceptual problems of measurement in the services sector.  
Some of these, such as quality adjustment and the one-off nature of services like law and 
accountancy, apply widely.  Though not necessarily unique to services they are perhaps more 
prevalent there.  There follow some brief comments on conceptual problems in particular 




Banks are multi-product firms.  Some of their products, like the money transmission service, 
are relatively straightforward to measure, others (“financial intermediation”) are more 
elusive.  There is a long-standing debate on whether a gross or a net approach to output 
measurement should be employed.  In banking, as Jack Triplett has said, there is no 
agreement on what constitutes “price times quantity”, so there cannot be agreement on 





Insurance is also a type of financial intermediation and there is a “price times quantity” issue 
here too.  With the 1990 weights, non-life insurance made a negative contribution to constant 
price GDP since value added (the weight) is measured as premiums net of claims and this 
happened to be negative.  (This does not stop the insurance industry being profitable since 
income earned on reserves fills the gap).   
 
Wholesale and retail trade 
 
Output in wholesale and retail trade is measured by the volume of sales.  Though most of this 
sector’s output is classified as precisely deflated, there is no attempt made to capture quality 
of service.  So if supermarkets stay open more days a week or for longer hours, or have faster 
checkout procedures, or offer a greater variety of products, this will have no impact on their 
measured output.   
                                                 
28  See Berger and Humphrey (1992) and Fixler and Zieschang (1992) for alternative approaches to output 
measurement in banking.   
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There is one exception to this neglect of quality of service.  In the RPI, prices are 
collected by shop type and any difference between shop types in the prices for the same item 
is ascribed to quality.  So if consumers switch from less to more expensive shops, this will 
show up as an increase in retailing output, given the growth of the nominal value of turnover 
and the growth rates of prices in the two types of shop.  However, since shops are divided 
only into “multiples” and “independents” in the RPI it is not clear how important this effect is 
in practice.  The general point is that improvement or deterioration in quality of service 
within each shop type is not captured in the RPI.   
The same point applies to hotels and restaurants where output is measured to a large 
extent by deflated expenditure on food, alcohol and tobacco.  This procedure will not capture 
a general improvement or deterioration in level of service in a given type of establishment.   
A similar point applies to the retailing aspects of banking.  Neither the spread of ATMs 
nor the closure of branches has had any direct effect on the output estimates.   
 
B.5  Quantitative importance of measurement errors in service sector output 
 
As discussed above, the ONS uses real gross output as a proxy for real value added.  This 
induces an error in the estimate of GDP(O) growth.  The growth rates of real value added in 
the private service industries are then adjusted to remove any discrepancy between the 
growth rates of GDP(E) and GDP(O), whether arising from the use of single rather than 
double deflation or from errors and omissions.  Here we set that issue aside and deal only 
with the error in the real gross output proxy.   
The Boskin Commission argued that the US CPI had a likely upward bias of 1.1 
percentage points per annum, of which 0.6 p.p. per annum was due to underestimating the 
effects of quality change and new goods (Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price 
Index (1996)).  If Boskin was right about the quality change/new goods bias in the US, then 
arguably a bias of similar magnitude exists for the UK (Crawford (1996); Oulton (1998)).   
If this is the bias in an area where considerable resources are put into price collection, 
then the bias might be larger in areas which rely on cruder methods.  This concern is 
reinforced when we recall that the finance and business services sectors in particular have 
seen a great deal of product innovation in recent years.  But this argument has to be treated 
with caution since there is an important difference between these two sectors.  In finance, the 
ONS relies much more heavily on output indicators which arguably might be subject to the 
quality change/new goods bias.  In business services, as we have seen, the ONS uses mainly  
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deflated turnover.  The deflator is either RPIX or an earnings index, the latter adjusted for 
(assumed) productivity growth.  If RPIX is used, this is probably similar to assuming that 
productivity rises in this sector at the same rate as in the rest of the economy.  So all depends 
on whether the assumed productivity growth is realistic or not.  In this case, there seems no 
way of assessing even the direction of any bias.   
 
B.6  Conclusions 
 
The main problem which the ONS faces in measuring service sector output is the absence of 
true price indices for much of the sector.  This problem is acute for finance and business 
services.  In these industries (sections J and K of the 1992 SIC), output is mainly measured 
by input with an adjustment for productivity growth.  The productivity growth adjustment is 
an assumption rather than a measurement since it is mainly based on productivity growth in 
other industries.  Private service industries where productivity growth is assumed rather than 
measured account for about 12.5% of GDP.   
The current methodology is not able to capture changes in service quality which may be 
occurring in retailing, retail banking, hotels and restaurants.  In transport, the output measures 
do not capture the dimensions of reliability, punctuality and frequency.   
Until the 1998 Blue Book output in the public sector was measured entirely by input, with 
no adjustment for productivity growth.  This has now changed and output indicators are 
employed instead for about half of the public sector; this proportion is likely to rise.  
However, the new methodology has been carried back only to 1986.   
What of the future?  The development of the Corporate Services Price Indices will 
gradually improve measurement in this sector.  An improvement in measuring output in the 
public sector has already occurred due to the development of output indicators.  This 
approach will no doubt be further extended.  However, any changes to methodology are 
unlikely to be carried back to cover the whole run of past data on which econometric studies 
must rest.  So there is a sense in which current limitations of the methodology will be with us 
forever.   
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Table B.1 
Proportion of real output in services measured by different methods, by SIC92 Section,  
in 1990 prices (pre-1998 Blue Book methodology) 
 
        Method   
SIC92 
Section 



















    %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
G  Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, etc. 
11.69  11.48  0.0  0.0  25.7  74.3  100.0 
H  Hotels and restaurants  2.90  2.78  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0 
I  Transport, storage and 
communication 
8.25  8.39  0.0  0.2  29.4  70.4  100.0 
J  Financial intermediation  6.74  7.15  12.0  37.6  23.6  26.8  100.0 
K  Real estate, renting and 
business activities 
18.35  17.26  3.0  48.6  3.1  45.4  100.0 
L  Public administration and 
defence; compulsory 
social security  
6.12  6.61  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
M  Education  5.60  4.87  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
N  Health and social work  6.46  5.93  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0 
O  Other community, social 
and personal service 
activities 
4.29
a  3.34  27.5  0.0  0.0  72.5  100.0 
P  Private households with 
employed persons 
n.a.  0.39  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0 
  Total services  70.40  68.28  28.9  16.3  11.2  43.7  100.0 
 
 
Note    Total services are calculated before netting off the “Adjustment for financial 
services”, 5.13% of 1990 and 4.02% of 1995 GDP.  Under SNA93 and ESA95, most though 
not all of the adjustment will be apportioned to and netted off each industry’s value added in 
the non-financial sector.  The remainder, about 2% of GDP, will show as an increase in GDP 
(Begg et al 1996).   
 
Source   Calculated from Sharp (1998), Table 2.  The treatment of the public sector 
changed in the 1998 Blue Book.  See the text for further explanation.   
 
a.  Includes section P.   
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